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CAN FORCE PROTECTION AND THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANS PEACEFULLY
CO-EXIST IN COUNTRIES WITH A HIGH TERRORIST THREAT?

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

CAN FORCE PROTECTION AND THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANS PEACEFULLY CO-EXIST IN COUNTRIES WITH A HIGH TERRORIST THREAT?

Based on President Bush's Inauguration Speech, the strategy of engagement will continue to be the foundation of U.S. foreign policy as it is enunciated in the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. Since the national policies have not fundamentally changed with a new administration, it is incumbent on the military to adapt force protection procedures to permit the military to achieve successful engagement with high terrorist threat countries, thereby meeting the goals of the Unified Commander's Theater Engagement Plan.

The terrorist attack on the USS COLE (DDG 67) was yet another "defining moment" or "watershed event" in the three successful terrorist attacks on U.S. military targets that started with the Marine Barracks, Beirut terrorist attack in 1983 and continued with the Khobar Towers Air Force facility terrorist attack in 1996 in bringing to the forefront of the nation's attention the national policy of engagement and generated an increased demand for force protection. The misguided solution to this problem would be to disengage from developing countries and focus engagement on other countries in the region in an attempt to shape the region. I will explore the policy of engagement and the three terrorist attacks to show that engagement is too important to quit and through better force protection the U.S. military can successfully conduct this policy.

Conducting engagement activities (including those of transiting forces) in higher threat areas in support of the national security strategy and national military strategy requires completely coordinated priorities, policies and oversight at all levels. The pervasive and enduring threat calls for some adjustments to national level policies and procedures.

Department of Defense USS COLE Commission Report of 9 January 2001¹

The enemies of liberty and our country should make no mistake: America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom.

President George W. Bush Inaugural Address 20 January 2001

Based on President Bush's Inauguration Speech, the strategy of engagement will continue to be the foundation of U.S. foreign policy as it is enunciated in the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. Since the national policies have not fundamentally changed with a new administration, it is incumbent on the military to adapt force protection procedures to permit the military to achieve successful engagement with high terrorist threat countries, thereby meeting the goals of the Unified Commander's Theater Engagement Plan.

The missions of engagement and "forward presence" as a peacetime means of shaping regions around the world are not new to the military, particularly the U.S. Navy. From Decatur and the Barbary Coast to Perry in Japan to the around the world cruise of the Great White Fleet, forward presence and engagement by the U.S. military has been a traditional instrument in effecting this policy. The policy of engagement continues to be a complex mission, more than the Navy slogan of "Join the Navy and see the world" portrays. Adding to the problem is the absence of a

clear definition of engagement in joint and Service-specific doctrine as well as the difficulty in properly evaluating it at the operational and strategic levels. The result is that the concept is easily misunderstood at the tactical level.

The application of engagement is most complex with developing countries. These are the countries that may have the symptoms of a "failing state", usually are struggling economically, have different cultures from ours, and in which limited training value is derived for the U.S. units participating in bilateral exercises with these countries. Compounding the challenges to these countries is the increased threat of terrorism from disenfranchised segments of the population. These segments seize on the asymmetrical nature of terrorism as a means to strike at their government and counter the strength of U.S. engagement.

The terrorist attack on the USS COLE (DDG 67) was yet another "defining moment" or "watershed event" in the three successful terrorist attacks on U.S. military targets that started with the Marine Barracks, Beirut terrorist attack in 1983 and continued with the Khobar Towers Air Force facility terrorist attack in 1996 in bringing to the forefront of our nation's attention the policy of engagement and generated an urgent demand for force protection. One misguided solution to this problem would be simply to disengage from developing countries and focus engagement on other countries in the region in an attempt to shape the region. I will explore the policy of engagement and the three terrorist attacks to show that engagement is too important a strategy to be abandoned; and through better force protection measures, show that the U.S. military can, indeed, successfully conduct this policy.

THE POLICY OF ENGAGEMENT

The best ambassador is a Man-of-War

- Oliver Cromwell

The reality of engagement and its value in implementing foreign policy has been around since the time of sail. Its value was realized during the United States' last two conflicts, Operation *Desert Storm* and Operation *Allied Force* in Kosovo. During hostilities in the Gulf War, maritime interoperability with coalition forces was significantly easier since the United States Navy had operated and trained with sixteen of our eighteen maritime coalition partners in the two years prior to the war. Additionally, common training and exercises with our NATO partners minimized operational maritime interoperability obstacles in Operation *Allied Force* in Kosovo. While these two examples are the engagement policy highlights, the terrorist attack on USS COLE and the corresponding question of “Why was COLE refueling in *Yemen*?” from the U.S. public have brought this policy to the forefront of discussion.

While the value of the man-of-war as an adjunct to diplomacy has been used for hundreds of years, the U.S. policy of Engagement was not formalized until the 1990's, first in the National Security Strategy and then in the derivative National Military Strategy. The *National Security Strategy of a New Century* distinguished engagement as a critical ingredient in maintaining peace and stability around the world.² The *National Military Strategy* details three specific elements of engagement as: shaping the international environment; responding to the full spectrum of crisis; and preparing now for an uncertain future.³

The three components of engagement are not new activities, nor a radical new type of foreign or military policy. Instead, they constitute a new formalized process that will have more focus and control at the operational and strategic levels by theater CINCs and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From a naval standpoint, the 1998 Department of the Navy Posture Statement stated that “Peacetime engagement is our primary means of shaping the international environment; it is a traditional role for the Navy and Marine Corps.”⁴

Subsequent to the formalization of national security and military strategies, engagement policy was first officially detailed and promulgated as part of a Unified Commander’s Theater Engagement Plan in February 1998.⁵ The definitions of the two most commonly used phrases that refer to engagement in these Theater Engagement Plans and in this paper are “Peacetime Military Engagement” (PME) and “Theater Engagement Planning” (TEP). Peacetime Military Engagement includes all of those military activities in peacetime which serve to reduce potential sources of conflict, improve multinational military interoperability capability, and maintain Department of Defense access and influence in key areas of the world. Broadly speaking, these activities fall into three components: overseas presence; joint and combined exercises; and direct military-to-military contacts. Theater Engagement Planning is the formal process that requires Unified Commanders to plan, report and evaluate such activities.⁶

One of the most difficult parts of Peacetime Military Engagement is engagement with developing countries. For this paper I will define developing countries as those countries with the following attributes: geographically - they are predominantly in Africa and the Middle East, economically and politically - they are increasingly falling behind the western world primarily due to a lack of natural resources and/or due to rampant ethnic or religious tensions. These countries are

the breeding ground for failed states as well as other international problems as crime, illegal immigrants, drugs, disease, pollution, terrorism and the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction. These countries are also very different from the United States due to differences, for example in their language, culture, government, military capabilities and economy. These are the countries in which at the tactical level, “liberty for the crew” is poor to non-existent and “crew training” during a bilateral exercise is also poor to unproductive. Additionally, a number of these developing countries, like Yemen, are also high risk to U.S. military personnel due to higher threat level of terrorism. Specific U.S. interests for these countries in the Middle East and Mediterranean littoral were described by the Department of Defense as being “...long term interests including maintaining uninterrupted access to regional energy resources, stemming the development and proliferation of NBC weapons, and ensuring the success of the Middle East Peace Process and combating terrorism.”⁷

TERRORISM AND FORCE PROTECTION

The report stated that the bombing was a terrorist act tantamount to an act of war which was carried out by a state sponsored entity. Such terrorism is seen as an increasingly severe threat for which the US military must be prepared. The Commission recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the development of doctrine, planning, organization, force structure, education, and training necessary for this defense.

Long Commission Report on the Beirut Marine Barracks Terrorist attack 1983⁸

The statement above from the Long Commission’s report despite having been written in 1983 could have easily been included in the Downing Commission report on the Khobar Towers

terrorist act in 1996 or the COLE Commission report of 2001, eighteen years later. While many force protection lessons have been learned and incorporated in the planning for military operations since these tragic events, there is still a need to further develop force protection doctrine, concepts and tactics, techniques and procedures that will ensure the safety of our service members and their mission accomplishment. This paper will address force protection issues and lessons learned from these three major terrorist acts of the past for integration into future operations.

The protection of Department of Defense personnel and facilities from the asymmetrical attack of the terrorist is a daunting task for the commander. Combatant commanders and the Services continue to focus on force protection issues as a first order priority. Although force protection methods and procedures have greatly improved since 1983, there is still a myriad of DOD and Service directives and instructions on the issue. The Chief of Naval Operations, in a recently promulgated instruction that sets Service standards for anti-terrorism and force protection, defines force protection as “security programs designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations, accomplished through the planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs.”⁹

MARINE BARRACKS, BEIRUT BOMBING - 23 October 1983

In September 1982, 1200 U.S. Marines, members of a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) and a Battalion Landing Team (BLT), were ordered ashore into the city of Beirut, Lebanon as part

of a multinational force that was organized to expedite the withdrawal of foreign military forces and allow the government of Lebanon to reestablish its sovereignty over Lebanon. The Marines established a position in the area of the Beirut International Airport that was located between the Israeli Defense Forces and the local population of Beirut.

Despite having received over a hundred bomb threats or warnings of possible terrorist bombings, the Marines were not prepared to defend against the terrorist car bombing attack on the Battalion Landing Team Headquarters and Barracks building on the morning of 23 October 1983.¹⁰ The attack was carried out by a lone suicide terrorist who drove a truck through a barbed wire and concertina fence and passed between two Marine guard posts without being engaged by fire, entered an open gate, passed around one sewer pipe barrier and between two others, drove over the Sergeant of the Guard's sandbagged booth at the building's entrance, and penetrated into the lobby of the building before the car bomb exploded causing the death of 241 personnel and injuring 100 others. The attack forced U.S. military and political leaders to expeditiously terminate the Beirut mission and extract the remaining Marines from Beirut.

The Long Commission in investigating the attack focused primarily on the growing phenomenon of terrorism, its substantial increase in the preceding 15 years throughout the world, its increasing severity or lethality, as well as its use as a method of state-sponsored warfare. It also recognized that "Terrorist groups are hard to predict and hard to penetrate. Whereas they can attack anything, anywhere, anytime, governments cannot protect everything, everywhere, all the time."¹¹ Additionally, while the Long Commission also recognized that conventional forces were not "adequately prepared" to confront the problems of terrorism, "they must be able to confront diverse modes of conflict, including terrorism."¹² The report of the Long Commission, while it successfully

identified the increasing threat of the terrorist to U.S. military forces, stopped short of providing constructive conclusions or suggestions for improving force protection.

KHOBAR TOWERS - 25 June 1996

The attack on US forces at Khobar Towers has dramatically underscored that for US forces deployed overseas, terrorism is a fact of life.... (the) attack should be seen as a watershed event pointing the way to a radically new mind-set and dramatic changes in the way we protect our forces deployed overseas from this growing threat.

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, *Report to the President on the Protection of US Forces Deployed Abroad*, 15 September 1996¹³

Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia was the next significant terrorist attack that forced the U.S. military to reexamine force protection and the impact of terrorism on deployed military personnel. Khobar Towers was a housing facility built by the Saudi Arabian government that berthed the almost 3000 military personnel from the United States, United Kingdom, France and Saudi Arabia who were supporting Operation *Southern Watch*, the coalition air operation over Iraq. On 25 June 1996 a terrorist bomb truck exploded outside the northern perimeter of the facility causing 19 deaths and 500 wounded. Similar to the U.S. reaction to the Beirut incident, soon after the Khobar Towers act, a retired flag officer, in this case Army General Wayne Downing, was appointed to lead the investigation of this tragic event.

The Downing Commission report was very similar to the Long Commission report in recognizing the impact of terrorism. "...Terrorism provides less capable nations, or even organizations, with the means to project a particularly insidious form of power, even across borders,

and contest US influence.”¹⁴ But more importantly, the Commission's report instead of focusing exclusively on the growing international threat of terrorism, made several important findings and recommendations regarding force protection.

The following were the most significant of the Downing Commission recommendations regarding force protection: for the Department of Defense to define a single force protection standard, promulgating directives that are “directive” instead of being “advisory” in nature. Designate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal advisor and the single Department of Defense wide focal point for force protection activities, Make the Department of Defense responsible for force protection for forces overseas instead of the Department of State, Improve the use of intelligence for counter terrorism and anti-terrorism and take more active intelligence measures against terrorists, Establish formal force protection working relationships and responsibilities between the United States and host nations, Increase the funding for force protection and recognize it as an integral part of every military mission, and finally, determine the question of the accountability of the chain of command in this particular incident.

The findings of the Downing report made a significance impact on the Department of Defense, which quickly responded in establishing a higher standard for force protection. Yet force protection procedures, training, tactics, and techniques still remained inconsistent and differed widely throughout a theater by location and by Service. Additionally, another negative impact on overseas force protection was the limited availability of trained U.S. military personnel for base security. This deficiency has forced local commanders to use host nation and other foreign personnel to augment U.S. security forces to maintain adequate security.

From a mission standpoint, the Khobar Towers attack was different from the Beirut attack in its response by the United States' National Command Authorities. Instead of pulling out of Saudi Arabia, the U.S. and its Allies resumed the mission of Operation *Southern Watch* three days after the attack and significantly elevated force protection to a major mission in the operation. Secretary Perry stated in his report to the President, “Sacrificing our strategic interests in response to terrorist acts is an unacceptable alternative. We cannot be a great power a live in a risk-free world. Therefore we must gird ourselves for a relentless struggle in which there will be many silent victories and some noisy defeats.”¹⁵

USS COLE (DDG 67) - 11 October 2000

Since the attack on Khobar Towers in June 1996, the Department of Defense has made significant improvements in protecting its service members, mainly in deterring, disrupting and mitigating terrorist attacks on installations (emphasis part of report). The attack on the USS COLE (DDG 67)...demonstrated a seam in the fabric of efforts to protect our forces, namely in-transit forces. Our review was focused on finding ways to improve the United States policies and practices for deterring, disrupting and mitigating terrorist attack on US forces in transit.

Department of Defense USS COLE Commission report of 9 January 2001¹⁶

Terrorists attacked the ARLEIGH BURKE -class guided missile destroyer, USS COLE (DDG 67), on 11 October 2000, two hours after the ship had moored at a refueling pier in the port of Aden, Yemen. Despite having refueled several other U.S. naval ships which were transiting to or from the Persian Gulf without underway replenishment opportunities, Aden was considered by the

Department of State to be a potentially dangerous due to a threat of terrorism, but was still considered to be safer by CENTCOM than several other alternative ports in the area and was designated as Threat Level BRAVO.¹⁷ Additionally, the refueling and daylong presence of a U.S. ship was part of the CINC's Theater Engagement Plan to demonstrate naval presence and peacetime engagement for Yemen.

The attack was conducted by a small boat carrying two men and a large explosive device that rammed into COLE's beam detonating a charge that ripped a 40 by 40 foot hole in the ship's hull and in the process killed the two terrorists and 17 COLE sailors. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, a Joint Task Force was established in Yemen for the temporary repair, force protection and medical support of COLE and her crew. All U.S. Naval forces inport in the CENTCOM Theater were ordered underway and Threat Condition DELTA, the highest of the military's threat levels, was set throughout the theater for the next 40 days. Even the Atlantic Fleet declared Threat Condition BRAVO as a result of the attack. Once again, as with the previous two attacks, an investigation commission was designated by the Department of Defense, headed by retired flag officers.

The results of the COLE Commission represented a process improvement over the two previous terrorist attack commissions. It specifically highlighted the differences and difficulties of the mission of force protection for units in transit, particularly units like COLE, transiting between two theaters of operation and were between the respective areas of responsibility of EUCOM and CENTCOM. The report stressed that, while significant improvements had been made in the area of force protection in response to the Downing Commission report of 1996, many more improvements were still required, particularly at the level of the theater CINCs and Service component staffs in

providing the corporate knowledge, focused threat intelligence, security personnel and the requisite staff oversight and “attention” to the transiting unit.

The other new area explored in this report was a review of the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy policy of engagement that was the reason that COLE refueled in Yemen. The report's review of this policy was inconsistent in this area and had seemingly two conflicting outlooks on engagement. First it stated that “...the premise that worldwide presence and continuous transit of ships, aircraft and units of the United States military support the engagement elements of both the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Military Strategy* and are in the nation’s best interest.”¹⁸ Yet, two paragraphs later, the same report stated that “...the pervasive and enduring threat (terrorism) calls for some adjustments to national level policies and procedures.”¹⁹

ANALYSIS OF ENGAGEMENT PLANS IN REGARD TO EXERCISING FORCE

PROTECTION

If you want to try confidence builders with a country like Yemen, you don’t lead off by putting military ships in such a vulnerable position

Former Secretary of the Navy James Webb in a speech November 15, 2000²⁰

If we change our refueling policy with Yemen or our engagement strategy, we send a clear signal to the enemy. Terrorism works.

Thomas Rancich in U.S. Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS November 2000²¹

Secretary Webb's quote was the first salvo in the public debate concerning the policy of engagement in the aftermath of the COLE attack. Webb elaborated in his speech that he believes that "COLE was sent into harm's way because of an errant U.S. policy that uses warships as diplomatic tools."²² The Senate Armed Services committee also met to discuss the issue and stated, "The whole concept of making stops in high-risk ports for operational needs as well as furthering political objectives is now being reviewed."²³ In addition to the COLE attack, the committee also questioned the port call and associated bilateral exercise to the port of Algiers, Algeria by the USS ARTHUR W. RADFORD (DD 968) in May 2000. This port call and exercise were brought into question since they were conducted despite the current Department of State travel warning for Algeria that warned U.S. citizens to avoid Algeria due to the high threat of terrorism.

Foreign policy analysts have made the argument for "disengagement" instead of engagement as U.S. policy even before the latter was actually formalized as part of our national strategy, particularly in regards to our policy in volatile Middle East region. The disengagement policy was most aggressively advocated in the late 1970's and early 1980's as a result of several turbulent events in the region: the Iranian overthrow of the Shah; the Iranian embassy hostage crisis; civil war in Lebanon; U.S. hostages in Lebanon; and the terrorist attack on the Marine Barracks in Beirut. These events were evidence to the disengagement proponents that the U.S. no longer had the ability to effectively shape the region and instead was hazarding Americans in their futile attempt to persist.²⁴

The disengagement proponents also based their arguments on the economics of oil. Since the U.S. only imports 3 percent of its oil from the Middle East and Lebanon does not even have oil,

we do not have a national interest in the area. Consequently, we should either let our allies in Europe and Asia who rely on importing that oil to shape the region or simply disengage from the region to allow Lebanon and other nations of the Middle East to solve their own problems.²⁵

Another justification for U.S. “disengagement” theorized that a strong correlation exists between U.S. overseas presence and intervention and the increase in terrorist attacks targeting U.S. interests and military. Or more simply stated, the U.S. military overseas presence actually stimulates terrorism against the U.S. military and interests.²⁶

CONCLUSION

We are vulnerable, paradoxically, because our leadership, which is our greatest strength, makes us a target for those who want to destroy regional order. The need for engagement follows both from our strength and our vulnerability. We need to be engaged because only the United States can provide the leadership necessary to respond to global and regional challenges to stability and only the United States can foster the growth of regional security structures that will prevent future challenges from arising.

Representative Ike Shelton speech 5 October 1998²⁷

The U.S. military has attempted to exploit the lessons learned from the Beirut, Khobar Towers and COLE attacks to continue to improve in the fight to reduce the threat of terrorism. There is no question that the U.S. military’s anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism training and methodology have improved after each event and, probably will continue to improve. The world continues to be a dangerous place in which the number of terrorist attacks increased last year.²⁸ Consistent with the trend, the present day asymmetrical threats of weapons of mass destruction and

computer network attack are more lethal from a human life and economic standpoint and are a significant terrorist threat to the U.S. military.

Force protection is the last line of defense against the direct threat of terrorism to U.S. forces and must be applied wisely to ensure its effectiveness against the threat without losing sight of the unit's primary mission. I believe that the changes implemented by the Department of Defense due to recommendations from the Downing Commission resulted in dramatic security improvements for base installations. I also believe that the COLE Commission recommendations will be acted on and will provide similar results for military units in transit.

The national policy of engagement and "forward presence" that we have espoused have been proven as effective and is too important to national security and world wide stability to be reversed or undermined by the threat of terrorism. A retrenchment from the current engagement policy or a shift to selective disengagement policy as a tenet of future foreign policy or as a method to minimize the threat of terrorism would be short-sighted and unsound. In the short term, disengagement is attractive since it will possibly save lives or units that could be targets for terrorist. In the longer term, however, its impact will be detrimental to regional and world security and provide the opportunity for a leadership vacuum that will be quickly filled by terrorists or other regional powers with aspirations to increased influence at the expense of another country. Recent military operations in Kuwait and the Falklands, that are costly in terms of money and lives have unfortunately demonstrated this.

The world has become increasing smaller due to globalization in the areas of economics and culture. Globalization is the result of increased economic integration and inter-dependency; rapid international travel; impact on world cultures of CNN news and Hollywood movies; and most

recently the power of information via the INTERNET. Consequently, engagement around the world and particularly in developing countries like Algeria and Yemen is necessary as a means of “maintaining strong alliances, fostering economic integration, controlling weapons proliferation, humanitarianism, and the promotion of democratic principles.”²⁹ Engagement is also a means of preventing the instability in regions, which allows terrorism to become established and become a global problem.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I agree with all the COLE Commission's recommendations for improving force protection. The report's recommendation argues for more intelligence, more training, more support and coordination from the theater Service component commanders and theater CINC staffs, more resources for improved force protection equipment and technology; and better defined doctrine. All these recommendations are outstanding and could have a significant impact. The two areas that require the most attention are unit training and theater support from the commanders.

Effective unit level force protection training for ships will be particularly difficult, though not impossible. In the long term, the Navy needs to establish a career field for tactical force protection officers and petty officers, who would be the experts and trainers on all units and staffs. The present system of using a ship's poorly trained and understaffed Master at Arms force or assigning an already overworked division officer with another collateral duty and minimum training as the unit force protection officer is inadequate. Until this career field is established and introduced into the fleet, ship crews will require dramatically increased training in small arms; anti-terrorism measures;

rules of engagement; and a new inport force protection command and control plan to properly employ a ship's force protection team.

My recommendation for theater support from the component commander and CINC's staff is to use the Reserve Port Security units to train up several Port Security detachments that can be deployed throughout a theater for increased security and augmentation to ship's force protection teams during port visits. These detachments would work with the U.S. country teams (local embassy, Defense Attaché, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) agent, civilian logistic support personnel; and host nation military to conduct current port vulnerability assessments prior to the visit and security during the visit. Optimally each of these detachments would also have a member fluent in the local language. Furthermore, with their local knowledge and personal contacts they would be a force multiplier in supporting a visiting ship's force protection force. To increase their knowledge of national culture and local threats, the detachments would be assigned a region of a theater to allow them to remain current with the issues and threats of each port. Additionally, the size of these detachments would be based on the security requirements for each port and most importantly would provide the commanders at all levels a source for local intelligence that, in conjunction with the Defense Attaché, would recognize changes in the local environment that could spell a threat to visiting ships. These detachments would be increasingly valuable in the future as the Navy shifts to minimum manned ships, unable to provide their own effective force protection.

No single recommendation will solve the threat of terrorism to transiting units in a high threat port, but as we learned from Beirut and Khobar Towers, the lessons we have learned from these attacks must be heeded and will go a long way to mitigating the risk of future attacks while the policy of engagement is executed.

¹Department of Defense. DOD USS COLE Commission Report. (Washington DC: 9 January 2001): 1

²The White House. A National Security Strategy For a Global Age. (Washington DC: December 2000):

³Department of Defense. National Military Strategy of the United States of America. (Washington DC: September 1997): 1

⁴Navy Department, 1998 Department of the Navy Posture Statement (Washington DC February 1999) <<http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/pos98/pos-pg02.html>> [17 March 2001]

⁵Joint Chiefs of Staff. Theater Engagement Planning. CJCS Manual 3113.10. (Washington DC: 1 February 1998): 1

⁶Lyon, Stuart, "Peacetime Military Engagement (PME)/Theater Engagement Planning" <[http://www-cgsc.army.mil/Djco/jug/tep.htm](http://www.cgsc.army.mil/Djco/jug/tep.htm)> [1 May 2001]:

⁷U.S. Department of Defense. Strengthening Transatlantic Security - U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century. Washington DC: December: 57.

⁸Jenkins, Brett Michael, "The Lessons of Beirut: Testimony Before the Long Commission" 17 November 1983. <<http://www.beirut-memorial.org/history/long.html>>[17 March 2001]

⁹Navy Department. Navy Combating Terrorism Program Standards. OPNAVINST 3300.55. (Washington DC: 2001): 2-3.

¹⁰Jenkins, Brett Michael, "The Lessons of Beirut: Testimony Before the Long Commission" 17 November 1983. <<http://www.beirut-memorial.org/history/long.html>>[17 March 2001]

¹¹Jenkins

¹²Jenkins

¹³Perry, William J., DOD Report to the President on Khobar Towers Bombing. Department of Defense Report. (Washington DC, 18 September 1997):

¹⁴Downing, Wayne A., Assessment of the Khobar Towers Bombing. Department of Defense Report. (Washington DC, 30 August 1996):

¹⁵Perry,

¹⁶Department of Defense. USS COLE Commission Report. Washington DC: 9 January 2001.

¹⁷THREATCON EXPLANATION- The Department of Defense has a system of Terrorist Threat Conditions or THREATCON. THREATCON is the principal means a commander uses to guard against terrorist threat. There are 5 progressive THREATCON levels: NORMAL is general threat of terrorist activity; ALPHA is general threat against personnel and installations; BRAVO is increased level due to a more predictable threat; CHARLIE is intelligence indicates imminent threat or incident occurs; and DELTA is specific target threat or attack occurs.

¹⁸Department of Defense. COLE Commission Report.

¹⁹Department of Defense. COLE Commission Report

²⁰Brown, David, "Policy Puts Ships in Harm's Way, Former Navy Secretary Says." Navy Times, (27 November 2000): 16.

²¹Rancich, Thomas, LCDR, USN "Combating Terrorism." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, (November 2000): 66

²²Brown, 16.

²³ Navy times article with RADFORD

²⁴ Richman, Sheldon L. "The United States in Lebanon: A Case for Disengagement" Policy Analysis, 35 (3 April 1984): 2-3

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Eland, Ivan, "Does U.S. Intervention Overseas Breed Terrorism? The Historical Record" Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing, 50 (17 December 1998): 1-2.

²⁷ Shelton, Ike, "International Engagement - Why We Need to Stay the Course," U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., 5 October 1998, 144, no.137, H9514.

²⁸ Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999. (Washington DC, April 2000):

²⁹ Abramowitz, Morton I. "Post Cold War U.S. Foreign Policy is Moving Forward in Some Sensible Directions", Washington DC, 17 May 1996

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